





Taxing Judicial Restraint: How Washington’s Supreme 
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In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a 
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of 
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a stat-




 In the realm of constitutional interpretation, the judicial depart-
ment reigns supreme.
2
 When a judge wields his or her interpretive power 
to “say what the law is,”
3
 nothing constrains the judge from concluding 
that the text means whatever the judge wants it to mean. In fact, when the 
textual language at issue fails to support the ultimate outcome, judges 
routinely look to sources other than the constitution’s text to justify a 
result.
4
 This behavior, however, corrupts the judge’s interpretive role.
5
 
                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A. Political Science, Seattle Pacific 
University, 2007. 
 1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 1 
(1990). 
 2. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 83 (Wash. 1978) (“The ultimate 
power to interpret, construe and enforce the constitution of this State belongs to the judiciary.”). 
 3. League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743,753 (Wash. 2013) (quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 749 (“Determining whether the constitution prohibits a particular legislative 
action requires the court to first examine the plain language of the constitutional provision at is-
sue.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 16 (2012) (“But to say that one begins with the words of the [text] is to suggest that one does 
not end there. Like the starting line of a boat race, the text is (on this view) thought to be a point of 
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Although the judge remains cloaked under the guise of interpreting the 
constitution’s text, the judge is constructing it, which is not a proper 
function of the court.
6
 
 League of Education Voters v. State (League) exemplifies the ju-
diciary’s potential abuse of its interpretive role
7
: The Washington Su-
preme Court misinterpreted its judicial function because it ignored the 
text of Washington State’s constitution and held a statute unconstitution-
al.
8
 The court, therefore, voided a statute because of judicial volition, not 
because Washington’s constitution demanded that outcome. 
 This Note challenges the reasoning in League and makes a novel 
suggestion for Washington State constitutional analysis, an approach that 
may apply to other states.
9
 Washington courts must reinvigorate the be-
yond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine, which declares that a statute is consti-
tutional unless the challenger proves the statute unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
10
 Courts have been saying for over a century that this 
                                                                                                                                        
departure for a much longer journey. So when you read qualified introductory bows to the text, brace 
yourself for a nontextual solution—maybe a far-fetched one.”) (emphasis in original). 
 5. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 3 (“In an age when democratically prescribed texts 
(such as statutes, ordinances, and regulations) are the rule, the judge’s principal function is to give 
those texts their fair meaning.”); see also Pierre Schlag, Framers’ Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of 
History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283, 291–92 (1985) (discussing how resorting to history to 
discern the “framers intent” leads to arbitrary decisions because no concrete way of discerning this 
intent exists). 
 6. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 13–14. Scalia and Garner discuss the equivocal 
nature of the term “construction.” Id. The noun “construction” can mean “to construe”—meaning “to 
interpret”—and can also mean “to construct”—meaning “to build.” Id. The phrase statutory con-
struction—in the sense of deriving meaning from the text—has long been used interchangeably with 
the phrase “statutory interpretation,” a proper function of courts. Id. But if you describe the judge’s 
role as constructing a text, which means the judge “builds the text,” you are mistakenly describing 
the role of the legislature rather than the judiciary. See id. at 13 n.41. A judge’s role, in an age of 
democratically prescribed texts, is interpreting—construing meaning from—the text, not construct-
ing it. See id. 
 7. See League, 295 P.3d at 743. 
 8. See id. 
 9. The solution discussed infra Part IV suggests a new theoretical rationale for the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt doctrine. Courts in other states also apply this doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 
826 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. 2013) (“[We] uphold a statute unless the challenging party demon-
strates that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Nichols v. R & D Const. 
Co., 60 A.3d 932, 938 (R.I. 2013) (stating a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless 
found constitutionally defective beyond a reasonable doubt); Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, Inc., 
291 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Mont. 2012) (“[W]e note that legislative enactments are presumed constitu-
tional, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Catalano, 104 So.3d 1069, 1075 (Fla. 2012) (“There is a 
strong presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid, and all reasonable doubts about the stat-
ute’s validity must be resolved in favor of constitutionality.”); 5K Farms, Inc. v. Miss. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 94 So.3d 221, 227 (Miss. 2012) (“[T]he courts are without the right to substitute their 
judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce it, un-
less it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 10. League, 295 P.3d at 749. 
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doctrine emerged out of judicial deference to the legislature, a coequal 
branch, as if “deference” prevents courts from striking down otherwise 
unconstitutional statutes.
11
 This Note proposes a new rationale and pur-
pose for the doctrine: The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine should 




 In this Note, Part II discusses the background of League of Edu-
cation Voters v. State and constitutional interpretation in Washington. 
Part III examines the League court’s reasoning. Part IV details a new 
analytical framework for constitutional analysis through the reformed 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine and applies that framework to the 
Supermajority issue addressed in League. Part V concludes the discus-
sion. 
II. THE SUPERMAJORITY’S HISTORY AND WASHINGTON 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. Brief History of the Supermajority Requirement 
 In 1993, voters approved initiative I-601, later codified into stat-
ute as RCW 43.135.034.
13
 This initiative imposed a voting restriction on 
bills that increased taxes.
14
 Before a new tax measure could become law, 
                                                             
 11. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 218 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, & Co. 1883). The Washington Supreme Court, in many of its decisions, respected Cooley’s 
treatise as an authority for interpreting and for understanding Washington’s constitution. See, e.g., 
Nathan v. Spokane Cnty., 76 P. 521, 522–25 (Wash. 1904); see also Petroleum Lease Properties Co. 
v. Huse, 80 P.2d 774, 776 (Wash. 1938) (“The object of this constitutional provision is stated by 
Judge Cooley, in a passage often quoted by this and other courts . . . . ”); Ransom v. City of S. Bend, 
136 P. 365, 366 (Wash. 1913) (“Judge Cooley says, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (5th 
Ed.) p. 201: ‘The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the Con-
stitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-
making power.’”). 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 13. League, 295 P.3d at 746. In 1993, voters passed I-601 by 51.21%—774,342 voted in favor 
and 737,735 opposed. Id. at 762. After 1993, voters passed initiatives that re-imposed the Superma-
jority requirement: In 2007, voters passed I-960 by 51.24%—816,792 voted in favor and 777,125 
opposed. Id. In 2010, voters passed I-1053 by 63.75%—1,575,655 voted in favor and 895,833 op-
posed. Id. Most recently, in 2012, voters passed I-1185 by 63.91%—1,892,969 voted in favor and 
1,069,083 opposed. Id. Voters re-imposed the Supermajority after the legislature suspended I-601 in 
2005, and voters passed subsequent initiatives to prevent the legislature from suspending the Super-
majority again. Id. at 746. An initiative restricts the legislature because the legislature may not modi-
fy or repeal an initiative for two years after its enactment unless the legislature can amass two-
thirds—a supermajority—of elected members in both houses. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c). 
 14. League, 295 P.3d at 746; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.135.034 (2010)—the Supermajority 
statute challenged in League—defined tax measures as “any action or combination of actions by the 
state legislature that increases state tax revenue deposited in any fund, budget, or account, regardless 
of whether the revenues are deposited into the general fund.” WASH. REV. CODE § 43.135.034(b). 
868 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:865 





 Washington’s constitution, however, only 
requires a simple majority vote of members—more than half—before a 
bill may become law.
17
 The goal of the Supermajority requirement was 
to erect a hurdle against the ordinary simple-majority passage of new 
taxes by requiring an increased consensus, effectively preventing the leg-
islature from increasing taxes in Washington.
18
 
 Political opponents of the Supermajority voiced their opposition 
before the 1993 election, abhorring the consequences of requiring more 
than a simple majority vote for new taxes: “The requirement for two-
thirds agreement in the legislature . . . could very well put control of the 
state’s future in the hands of a small group of legislators with extreme 
views. Majority rule protects everyone.”
19
 Nineteen years later in 2012, 
Supermajority opponents continued this battle cry, arguing that the Su-
permajority achieved its purpose of limiting taxes but at great conse-
quence.
20
 They argued that a Supermajority requirement made new tax 
measures practically impossible to pass.
21
 As a consequence, the Super-
majority prevented the legislature from raising necessary revenue to fund 
desirable programs such as education.
22
 
 Preceding its ultimate fate of unconstitutionality, the Superma-
jority endured a litigious history for twenty years.
23
 Before initiative I-
601 went into effect, challengers to the Supermajority brought a writ of 
mandamus action to the Washington Supreme Court, claiming that the 
Supermajority provision violated Washington’s constitution.
24
 The court 
dismissed the mandamus action as a nonjusticiable controversy because 
the initiative had not entirely gone into effect and because ambiguity ex-
isted regarding how the law would function.
25
 In 2009, after the senate 
president refused to forward a bill to the house of representatives because 
                                                             
 15. The legislature consists of two bodies: the house of representatives and the senate. WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 16. League, 295 P.3d at 746. 
 17. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 22. 
 18. See 1993 Washington Voters Pamphlet, WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE, 6 (Nov. 2, 1993), 
https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/documents/1993%20g
eneral%20election.pdf; see also Initiative Measure I-1053, WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE (Jan. 5, 
2010), http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i1053.pdf. 
 19. 1993 Washington Voters Pamphlet, supra note 18, at 7. 
 20. See Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 5–7, League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 
P.3d 745 (Wash. 2013) (No. 87425-5), 2012 WL 3600413 [hereinafter LEV’s Opening Brief]. 
 21. Id. at 7. 
 22. Id. 
 23. I-960 passed in 1993. League, 295 P.3d at 746. In 2013, the Washington Supreme Court 
found the Supermajority unconstitutional. Id. at 753. 
 24. Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920, 922 (Wash. 1994). 
 25. Id. at 924–25. 
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it received only a simple majority vote, not the Supermajority, a frustrat-
ed senator turned to the Washington Supreme Court for help.
26
 The sena-
tor demanded a writ of mandamus that would compel the senate presi-
dent to forward the bill. The senator also demanded a declaratory judg-
ment that the Supermajority violated Washington’s constitution.
27
 The 
Washington Supreme Court refused to address the Supermajority’s con-
stitutionality and dismissed the case, holding the mandamus action pre-
sented a nonjusticiable political controversy.
28
 
 The Washington Supreme Court’s continued refusal to address 
the constitutional issue, however, did not deter Supermajority opponents. 
The following facts provided justification for the Washington Supreme 
Court to ultimately find a justiciable controversy and decide the constitu-
tional challenge.
29
 In 2011, Substitute House Bill 2078 (SHB 2078) pur-
ported to narrow a tax deduction
30
 for large banks and other financial 
institutions and to direct the projected revenue toward funding class-
room-size reductions in kindergarten through third grade.
31
 SHB 2078 
gained simple-majority approval in the house of representatives, not the 
statutorily imposed Supermajority for new tax measures, and therefore 




 As a result of SHB 2078’s failed passage, the League of Educa-
tion Voters, the Washington Education Association, twelve Washington 
State legislators, and individual taxpayers (collectively, LEV), filed a 
complaint against the State of Washington in King County Superior 
Court.
33
 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Superma-
jority requirement—RCW 43.135.034—violated article II, section 22 of 
Washington State’s constitution.
34
 Pursuant to statute, the Washington 
                                                             
 26. See Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 313 (Wash. 2009). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 321. 
 29. See League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 747–48 (Wash. 2013). 
 30. Because eliminating tax deductions would raise revenue, the tax deduction fell under the 
definition of “raising taxes.” See former WASH. REV. CODE § 43.135.034 (2012).  
 31. League, 295 P.3d at 747. These facts are very similar to those in Walker, supra note 24, but 
the court rejected the obvious similarities. League, 295 P.3d at 748. The court reasoned that the 
mandamus action in Walker differed from the declaratory judgment action in League—despite the 
fact that the senator in Walker also requested a declaratory judgment. See Walker, supra note 24. 
 32. Id. SHB 2078 received 52 out of 98 votes in the House. LEV’s Opening Brief, supra note 
20, at 5. 
 33. League, 295 P.3d at 746–47. 
 34. Id. at 747. The plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that the referendum require-
ment of WASH. REV. CODE § 43.135.034 violated article II, section 1(b) of Washington State’s con-
stitution. Id. The Washington Supreme Court did not reach this issue. Id. at 749. 
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State Attorney General defended the Supermajority as constitutional.
35
 
The trial court held that the Supermajority violated article II, section 22 
of Washington’s constitution and declared the statute unconstitutional.
36
 
The State appealed that decision.
37
 
 After almost twenty years of finding the controversy nonjusticia-
ble, the Washington Supreme Court held that the legislators who voted in 
favor of SHB 2078 had standing to challenge the Supermajority.
38
 The 
court reasoned that the Supermajority undermined the effectiveness of 
the legislators’ votes because the bill received simple-majority approval, 
a number that would satisfy article II, section 22’s bill passage require-
ment.
39




B. Arguments to the Supreme Court 
 Article II, section 22 provides that “[n]o bill shall become a law 
unless on its final passage . . . a majority of the members elected to each 
house be recorded thereon as voting in its favor.”
41
 
 LEV argued that the Supermajority requirement conflicted with 
this language.
42
 Specifically, LEV argued that article II, section 22 re-
quires only a “majority”—more than half (a simple majority)—of mem-
bers in both legislative houses to pass a law, and therefore, the legislature 
cannot require more than a simple majority by statute.
43
 This argument 
asserted that article II, section 22’s voting requirement creates both a 
floor and a ceiling: A bill cannot receive less than a simple majority and 
still become law (the floor), and a bill also cannot be required to receive 
more than a simple majority before it becomes law (the ceiling).
44
 
                                                             
 35. Id. at 747. Washington’s attorney general has statutory permission to defend a statute’s 
constitutionality. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.24.110 (1935) (requiring party who challenges a statute’s 
constitutionality to serve the attorney general and entitling the attorney general an opportunity to be 
heard). 
 36. League, 295 P.3d at 747. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 748. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 749. 
 41. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 22. 
 42. LEV’s Opening Brief, supra note 20, at 23–24. 
 43. See id. at 34–35. Another way of framing this argument, which LEV also asserted, was that 
the Supermajority requirement, in effect, amended the constitutional language. Id. at 1. The Wash-
ington State Constitution makes clear that a constitutional amendment cannot occur by statute. See 
WASH. CONST. art. XXIII. 
 44. LEV’s Opening Brief, supra note 20, at 34–35. 
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 The State disagreed with the ceiling portion of LEV’s interpreta-
tion.
45
 According to the State, article II, section 22 merely creates a min-
imum voting requirement—a floor: No bill can become law if it receives 
less than a simple majority.
46
 Addressing the ceiling argument, the State 
contended that the text in article II, section 22 does not address this is-
sue.
47
 Under Washington State constitutional analysis, if the text of arti-
cle II, section 22 only addresses a minimum voting requirement but does 
not address a maximum—a ceiling—the legislature may statutorily re-
quire more than a simple majority.
48
 Thus, under the State’s interpreta-
tion, the Supermajority would be constitutional.
49
 
C. Constitutional Analysis in Washington State 
 Several fundamental constitutional principles provide the foun-
dation for Washington constitutional analysis. First, for the purposes of 
determining a statute’s constitutionality, the analysis remains the same 
whether the legislature enacted the statute or the people approved the 
statute through an initiative.
50
 Two logical corollaries accompany this 
analytical doctrine: If an initiative is constitutional, the same law would 
also be constitutional if passed by the legislature.
51
 In addition, if a 
Washington court strikes down an initiative because the initiative vio-
lates the constitution, this result prospectively prohibits the legislature 
and the people from enacting such a law.
52
 
 Second, Washington’s constitution differs substantially from the 
United States Constitution, not merely in language but also in theory.
53
 
The United States Constitution grants specific and limited powers to 
Congress.
54
 Congress must therefore act pursuant only to powers specifi-
cally enumerated in the Constitution’s text.
55
 In contrast, Washington’s 
constitution is not a grant of limited power but a restriction on otherwise 
                                                             
 45. See Opening Brief of State-Appellant at 26, League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743 
(Wash. 2013) (No. 87425-5), 2012 WL 3135663. 
 46. Id. at 28–29. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 51 (2002). 
 51. See, e.g., League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 754 (Wash. 2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 50, at 2; see also Charles H. Sheldon & Michael Stohr-
Gillmore, In the Beginning: The Washington Supreme Court a Century Ago, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 248 (1989) (discussing the constitutional premise of Washington’s founding fathers compared 
to their federal counterparts). 
 54. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 50, at 2. 
 55. Id. 
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plenary power.
56
 This concept means that the legislature may pass any 
law not textually restricted by Washington’s constitution or federal law.
57
 
 Third, Washington courts presume statutes are constitutional.
58
 A 
party challenging a statute’s constitutionality must prove the statute is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
59
 Therefore, if any doubts 
exist about a statute’s constitutionality, courts must resolve these doubts 
in the statute’s favor and hold the statute constitutional.
60
 The existence 
of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine suggests that textual interpre-
tation of a constitutional provision does not always result in a definitive 
and conclusive meaning.
61
 After all, if courts could always arrive at a 
definitive and conclusive meaning, the correctness of a particular inter-
pretation would never be doubtful. 
 Fourth, Washington State constitutional analysis is a textual ex-
ercise.
62
 When determining a statute’s constitutionality, courts must up-
hold the statute unless the constitution’s text, either expressly
63
 or by fair 
inference, limits the legislature’s power.
64
 The words in every provision 
of Washington’s constitution possess the same context and meaning that 
they did at the time the provision was drafted.
65
 Consequently, in their 
interpretive role, judges must give the words of the text the common and 
ordinary meaning they had when the provision was drafted.
66
 
 Fifth, when interpreting the constitution’s text, courts may look 
at extrinsic sources for the purpose of ascertaining the text’s meaning.
67
 
The Washington Supreme Court stated that “[i]n determining the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision, the intent of the framers, and the history 
of events and proceedings contemporaneous with its adoption may 
                                                             
 56. See id. at 2–3. 
 57. Id.; see also Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1959). 
 58. See, e.g., League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 749 (Wash. 2013). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Brunn, 154 P.2d 826, 836 (Wash. 1945) (“[A] legislative act is entitled to 
the presumption of constitutionality, and even if, at the end of this long inquiry, we should be in 
doubt as to the true intent of the double jeopardy clause of our constitution, we would still be re-
quired to hold the questioned act constitutional.”). 
 61. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 218. 
 62. See Malyon v. Pierce Cnty., 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1997) (“Appropriate constitution-
al analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there as well.”). 
 63. WASH CONST. art. II, § 25; State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle provides an example of an express 
limitation: “The legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer . . . .” 110 
P.2d 162, 168 (Wash. 1941). 
 64. See, e.g., Todd, 110 P.2d at 167; Malyon, 935 P.2d at 1281. 
 65. Todd, 110 P.2d at 165 (describing constitutional provisions as static); id. at 167 (reaffirm-
ing that statutes must be upheld unless an express or fairly implied limitation on the legislature’s 
power exists in the constitution). 
 66. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 45 (Wash. 2004). 
 67. See, e.g., State v. Brunn, 154 P.2d 826, 835 (Wash. 1945). 
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properly be considered.”
68
 Thus, if a judge struggles to understand what a 
word meant in the 1800s, a historical analysis, such as examining debates 
from Washington’s Constitutional Convention, might have merit.
69
 In 
addition to history, courts may also employ other helpful aids to interpre-
tation, such as dictionaries.
70
 
 Finally, a judge’s personal opinion that a statute embodies bad 
policy provides no justification for voiding a statute and, therefore, 
should not influence the court’s constitutional analysis.
71
 
III. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT’S REASONING IN                     
LEAGUE OF EDUCATION VOTERS V. STATE 
 Justice Owens wrote the 6–3 majority opinion
72
 in League that 
struck down the Supermajority requirement as unconstitutional.
73
 The 
court reasoned that plain language, constitutional history, and the weight 
of persuasive authority supported an interpretation of article II, section 
22 as setting a minimum and maximum voting requirement.
74
 The court’s 
reasoning divides into two discussions: textual and other considerations. 
A. The Court’s Textual Discussion 
 The court’s textual discussion contains two parts. First, the court 
examined article II, section 22’s “plain language.”
75
 Second, the court 
compared article II, section 22’s language to other provisions in the con-
stitution to strengthen its plain language interpretation.
76
 
                                                             
 68. Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wash. 1959). 
 69. Many Washington courts that conduct a historical analysis appear to delve almost exclu-
sively into the debates at the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 
1366 (Wash. 1998). Although this analysis might have merit depending on the case and what the 
convention records illuminate, a more fruitful source to resolve confusion might be a dictionary if 
the judge is perplexed by a constitutional provision’s language. 
 70. See, e.g., League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 750 (Wash. 2013). 
 71. See, e.g., id. at 746; see also COOLEY, supra note 11, at 86 (discussing how a statute cannot 
be declared void if it does not violate the text of the constitution, regardless of how unwise the con-
stitution or statute might seem). 
 72. League, 295 P.3d at 745. Three justices dissented, and two of them wrote dissenting opin-
ions. Id. at 753 (C. Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should have dismissed the case as 
a nonjusticiable political question and, thus, should have never reached the merits); id. at 756 (J.M. 
Johnson, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the court should not have reached the merits but also arguing 
that, on the merits, the Supermajority is constitutional). 
 73. Id. at 746 (majority opinion). 
 74. Id.at 745–46. However, as will be discussed in Part III and Part IV, infra, the fact that the 
constitution’s plain language and other factors support an interpretation of the constitution that con-
flicts with the statute is not dispositive. An interpretation that harmonizes the statute with the consti-
tution must be implausible—unreasonable—before the court strikes down a statute as unconstitu-
tional. See COOLEY, supra note 11. 
 75. League, 295 P.3d at 749–50. 
 76. Id. at 751. 
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1. Plain Language Examination 
 After examining article II, section 22’s plain language, the court 
ultimately concluded that this constitutional provision sets both a mini-
mum and a maximum voting requirement, thus preventing any alteration 
of the voting requirement by statute.
77
 Article II, section 22 states, “No 
bill shall become a law unless on its final passage . . . a majority of the 




 Interpreting the language’s ordinary meaning, the court said that 
“essentially [this provision] states that a bill cannot become a law upon 
any condition less than receiving more than half the vote.”
79
 The court 
used an 1899 edition of Webster’s International Dictionary for support:
80
 
Webster’s defines “unless” as “[u]pon any less condition than . . . if 
not”;
81




 With this understanding in mind, the court then committed a log-
ical mistake. In the same paragraph where it explained that article II, sec-
tion 22 means that a bill must receive “more than half the vote” before it 
becomes law, the court rephrased this meaning—presumably for the 
reader’s convenience or as a rhetorical sleight of hand—and arrived at an 
entirely different understanding: “In other words, if a bill has become 
law, then it must have been supported by a simple majority vote.”
83
 But 
the court is incorrect.
84
 If a bill becomes law, it must have been support-
ed by at least a simple majority vote—more than half. As the dissent cor-




 While a bill that becomes law may have been passed by exactly a 
“simple majority” vote—51%—the law may also have been passed by 
80% of members; 80% is certainly more than half and certainly more 
                                                             
 77. Id. at 749–50. 
 78. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 22. 
 79. League, 295 P.3d at 750. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.; WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1578 (1899). 
 82. League, 295 P.3d at 750; WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 855 (1899). 
 83. League, 295 P.3d at 750. 
 84. I assume the majority does not mean that a bill fails to become law if it receives more than 
a simple majority. Yet, under a plain language reading of the majority’s sentence, the majority inter-
prets article II, section 22 to mean that if a bill gets 100% of the vote, the bill cannot become law 
because the bill must garner a simple majority vote. For the word “majority” to be both a minimum 
and a maximum, logic dictates that a bill cannot receive more or less than a simple majority vote. 
 85. League, 295 P.3d at 760 (J.M. Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the confusion of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions defies logic and allows the majority to misinterpret article II, section 
22’s plain language). 
2014] Taxing Judicial Restraint 875 
than, not equal to, a simple majority. Yet, under the court’s rephrasing of 
article II, section 22, a bill that receives 80% of member votes must fail 
to become a law because 80% does not equal a simple majority. Alt-
hough the court’s inaccurate restatement of article II, section 22’s mean-




 After concluding that a law must have received exactly a simple 
majority vote, the court rejected the interpretation that a bill needs “at 
least a majority vote” because no language in section 22 qualifies “ma-
jority.”
87
 The court then provided a “commonsense understanding” of 
section 22’s language: “[A]ny bill receiving a simple majority vote will 
become law.”
88
 The court’s commonsense interpretation, however, fails 
to comport with reality. Before a bill can become law, the bill must com-
ply with article II, section 32,
89
 and the governor must sign it or neglect 
to veto it within the constitutionally prescribed time frame.
90
 
2. Article II, Section 22 Compared to Other Constitutional Provisions 
 The court attempted to strengthen its plain language interpreta-
tion by comparing article II, section 22 to other constitutional provisions. 
First, the court found importance in the fact that other sections of the 
constitution contain supermajority vote requirements while article II, sec-
tion 22 requires only a simple majority.
91
 Second, the court found a re-




a. Other Supermajority Requirements 
 The court noted that the framers used supermajority require-
ments in other portions of the constitution.
93
 For example, the constitu-





 Thus, the court reasoned, the fact that the framers knew 
                                                             
 86. See id. at 749–50 (majority opinion).  
 87. Id. at 750. 
 88. Id. 
 89. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32 (requiring that before a bill become law it must be signed by the 
presiding officers of both houses). 
 90. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (requiring that before a bill becomes law the governor must 
sign it or must not beto it within five days). 
 91. League, 295 P.3d at 751 (noting that the original constitution contained seven supermajori-
ty requirements in “special circumstances”); see also WASH. CONST. art. II, §§ 9, 36; art. III, § 12; 
art. IV, § 9; art. V, § 1; art. XXIII, §§ 1, 2. 
 92. See League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 93. Id. 
 94. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (expelling a member). 
 95. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (overriding a veto). 
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how to include supermajority vote requirements but chose not to include 
one in article II, section 22 evidences that the framers intended ordinary 
legislation to need only a simple majority to pass.
96
 
The court’s conclusion, however, does not follow logically. A con-
stitutional requirement and a statutory requirement differ in theory and 
effect.
97
 Therefore, an opinion about one cannot also address the other 
without more information. A constitutional provision is and remains the 
status quo unless the provision is amended through the constitution’s 
amendment procedure.
98
 Conversely, a statute alters the legal status quo 
and can be repealed any time by a simple majority vote.
99
 Because a con-
stitutional provision and a statute differ in nature, the framers’ decision 
not to impose a supermajority requirement for bill passage says nothing 
about the framers’ opinion regarding the legislature’s statutory power to 
do so. As the court itself admitted about the framers’ convention debates, 
“[t]here was no discussion of whether the legislature should be allowed 
to alter this [simple majority] requirement.”
100
 
b. Article II, Section 32 
 The court compared the language of article II, section 22 to the 
language of article II, section 32.
101
 Article II, section 32 reads, “No bill 
shall become a law until the same shall have been signed by the presid-
ing officer of each of the two houses in open session, and under such 
rules as the legislature shall prescribe.”
102
 
 Looking at section 32’s language, the court reasoned that the 
proviso “and under such rules as the legislature shall prescribe”—in a 
                                                             
 96. Compare League, 295 P.3d at 751 (“Thus, the framers were aware of the significance that a 
supermajority vote requirement entailed and consciously limited it to special circumstances; the 
passage of ordinary legislation is not one of those.”), with id. (When the framers debated article II, 
section 22, “[t]here was no discussion of whether the legislature should be allowed to alter this re-
quirement.”). 
 97. Compare WASH CONST. art. I, § 29: “The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, 
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise,” and WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1 (es-
tablishing the constitution’s amendment procedure), with Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. 
Gregoire, 174 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Wash. 2007) (“No legislature can enact a statute that prevents a 
future legislature from exercising its law-making power. That which a prior legislature has enacted, 
the current legislature can amend or repeal.”) 
 98. See WASH CONST. art. I, § 29 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”); see also WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1 (estab-
lishing the constitution’s amendment procedure). 
 99. See Wash. State Farm, 174 P.3d at 1145. A statute requires more than a simple majority 
vote to modify or repeal only when the statute was passed by initiative. See WASH. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1(c). 
 100. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 101. Id. at 751. 
 102. Id. at 760; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32. 
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negatively phrased provision similar to article II, section 22’s “[n]o bill 
shall become a law unless”—indicates that the framers intended all pro-
visions in article II to be exhaustive unless they expressly stated other-
wise.
103
 “Any other reading would render the proviso in section 32 super-
fluous, contrary to our canons of constitutional interpretation.”
104
 Unfor-
tunately, the court did not explain the logic of this conclusion.
105
 
 The majority probably reasoned as follows:
106
 Washington 
State’s constitution is not a grant of power but a restriction on power.
107
 
Therefore, unless the constitution restricts legislative power either ex-
pressly or by fair inference, the legislature’s power is unrestrained.
108
 No 
provision in the constitution restricts the legislature from creating inter-
nal rules regarding how a bill is signed, so the legislature must have this 
power by default. But in article II, section 32, the framers expressly 
granted the legislature this procedural power.
109
 The framers would have 
felt this express grant necessary only if they believed that the provisions 
in article II were “exhaustive”—that article II provisions create a status 
quo that can be altered only if expressly allowed, as in article II, section 
32. Therefore, any other reading of section 32’s proviso—“and under 
such rules as the legislature shall prescribe”—renders it unnecessary—
“superfluous”
110
—because, in theory, the legislature should have this 
procedural power by default. 
The Washington Supreme Court, by concluding that no other mean-
ingful interpretation of article II, section 32 exists, challenged its readers 
to conclude otherwise. 
                                                             
 103. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. The majority also neglects to explain why, even if the language of article II, sec-
tion 22 is “exhaustive,” the “exhaustive” nature of section 22 prevents the legislature from increas-
ing the vote requirement by statute. See id. Indeed, if section 22 means “at least a majority,” then this 
meaning is all that can be exhausted in section 22. But at this juncture, the majority already conclud-
ed that article II, section 22 means a bill must be passed by exactly a simple majority. Id. at 750. 
Thus, the majority makes a circular argument by stating section 22 is “exhaustive”: The words mean 
what they mean, and therefore, the words mean what they mean. 
 106. This rendition of the majority’s probable reasoning is not intended to create a straw man 
argument. Because the court failed to detail its reasoning, the reader is necessarily forced to specu-
late. However, this probable reasoning is implicit in what the court actually states. See id. at 750–51. 
 107. Although the majority struggles to find article II, section 32’s proviso that bills shall be 
signed “under such rules as the legislature shall prescribe” as meaningful, not superfluous, at least 
one other court implicitly stated that this proviso is superfluous. See State v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 249 P. 996, 1001 (Wash. 1926) (holding that, upon repassage of a bill following a governor’s 
veto, the Legislature may adopt any procedure through its “inherent power” to transmit information 
to the Secretary of State that the bill passed and to present the enrolled bill for filing). 
 108. See, e.g., Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1959). 
 109. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32. 
 110. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
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c. A Different, but Not Superfluous, Reading of Article II, Section 32 
 In legal theory, the court appears correct that section 32’s provi-
so is superfluous. Yet, the court’s conclusion—article II, section 32’s 
proviso has purpose only if article II is understood to be exhaustive—is 
wrong under textual scrutiny. When the text of article II, section 32 is 
compared to the text of article II, section 9, the framers’ intent becomes 
clear: The framers were not granting a power that did not already exist; 
the framers wanted to demarcate inherent, procedural-rulemaking author-
ity between the houses.
111
 
 Article II, section 32 imposes a duty on the presiding officer of 
each house to sign bills before they become law.
112
 Absent section 32’s 
proviso, section 32 provides no guidance or specifications regarding how 
this duty should be accomplished. For example, must the officers sign in 
blue or black ink? Must the officers sign in the physical presence of each 
other? Must witnesses be present when the officers affix their signatures? 
Section 32 does not answer these questions, and without an answer and 
even with section 32’s proviso, the legislature necessarily must agree on 
this minutia in order to accomplish section 32’s signature requirement. In 
legal theory, when a person is charged with accomplishing a task, with-
out minute specification for how that task should be accomplished, the 
person has incidental power to exercise discretion as to the manner and 
means of accomplishing that task.
113
 Thus, because article II, sections 32 
does not provide specifications, in legal theory, section 32’s proviso is 
completely unnecessary. 
 Section 32’s proviso, however, gains meaning when compared to 
article II, section 9.
114
 Article II, section 9 allows each house of the legis-
lature to determine the rules of its own proceedings.
115
 In legal theory, 
                                                             
 111. Compare WASH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“Each house may determine the rules of its own 
proceedings . . . .”), with WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32 (“under such rules as the legislature shall pre-
scribe”). 
 112. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32. 
 113. The idea is not novel in constitutional law that a legitimate end to be accomplished by the 
legislature includes all “necessary”—incidental—power for accomplishing that end. See M’Culloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 422 (1819) (“But we think the sound construction of the constitution must 
allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it 
confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties as-
signed to it . . . .”). Agency law might also be instructive. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 2.02(1) (2006) (“An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied in the princi-
pal’s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal’s objec-
tives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal’s manifestations and objectives when the 
agent determines how to act.”). 
 114. Compare WASH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“Each house may determine the rules of its own 
proceedings . . . .”), with WASH. CONST. art. II, §32 (“under such rules as the legislature shall pre-
scribe”). 
 115. Id. 
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this provision seems as superfluous as article II, section 32’s proviso. 
The constitution does not detail every aspect of how the legislature exe-
cutes its power, and therefore, the legislature already has implied discre-
tion in its authority to act.
116
 Like section 32, article II, section 9 appears 
to state the obvious. But article II, section 9 states that “[e]ach house may 
determine the rules of its own proceedings”
117
 while section 32 states that 
the signature requirement must occur “under such rules as the legislature 
shall prescribe.”
118
 Article II, section 9 allows each house to determine 
its own rules without interference from the other house, but article II, 
section 32 requires that the legislature work together. 
 If the framers’ intent is deduced from the text,
119
 the framers in-
tended that each house exclusively govern the day-to-day minutiae of its 
own proceedings. In the specific formal proceeding of signing a bill be-
fore it becomes law, however, the framers intended for the houses to con-
fer and agree about the proper procedure.
120
 Thus, under this interpreta-
tion, section 32’s proviso gains a purposeful meaning that does not rely 
on interpreting article II as exhaustive. Therefore, the court incorrectly 
concluded that “[a]ny other reading [of section 32] would render the pro-
viso in section 32 superfluous . . . . ”
121
 The court also incorrectly relied 
on this conclusion as a basis for holding the Supermajority unconstitu-
tional. 
B. Other Considerations 
 At its core, constitutional analysis is a textual exercise.
122
 As the 
textual discussion revealed, the court’s textual analysis did not establish 
the floor-without-a-ceiling interpretation of article II, section 22 as un-
reasonable. Although the textual discussion should be dispositive for 
constitutional analysis, the court went beyond the text in three ways—
presumably to strengthen its textual conclusion that rejected the floor-
                                                             
 116. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 422. 
 117. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
 118. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32. 
 119. See, e.g., Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9, 97 (N.Y. 1852) (“Whether we are considering an 
agreement between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with view to its interpretation, the thing 
which we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is 
to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which 
the framers of the instrument placed them. If thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning, 
which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then 
that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at liberty to say 
was intended to be conveyed.”) (emphasis in original). 
 120. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 32. 
 121. League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 751 (Wash. 2013). 
 122. See Malyon v. Pierce Cnty., 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1997) (“Appropriate constitu-
tional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there as well.”); see also Part 
II, supra. 
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without-a-ceiling interpretation. First, the court cited Gerberding v. Mun-
ro as precedent that supports reading article II, section 22 as both a floor 
and a ceiling.
123
 Second, the court expressed concern that upholding the 
Supermajority would create a “tyranny of the minority.”
124
 Finally, the 
court worried that if it upheld the Supermajority, the legislature or the 




1. The Precedent of Gerberding v. Munro 
 The majority in League cited to Gerberding v. Munro126 for the 
proposition that negatively phrased constitutional provisions do not cre-
ate minimum requirements to which the legislature may statutorily 
add.
127
 However, the court misunderstood the reasoning in Gerberding. 
The Gerberding majority merely held that the negative language at issue 
was not dispositive.
128
 The court, however, did not hold that negative 
language cannot create minimum threshold requirements or that negative 
language becomes irrelevant in textual interpretation.
129
 The League ma-
jority expanded Gerberding’s reasoning and therefore improperly used it 
as justification to void the Supermajority.
130
 
In Gerberding, the Washington Supreme Court determined whether 
qualifications for state officers established in the constitution were exclu-




 In 1992, Washington voters passed initiative I-573 into law.
132
   
I-573 prevented individuals who previously held legislative seats, the 
position of governor, or the position of lieutenant governor for a speci-
fied period of time from appearing on consecutive ballots for those offic-
es.
133
 Effectively, the initiative imposed term limits.
134
 
                                                             
 123. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366 (Wash. 1998). 
 127. League, 295 P.3d at 750. 
 128. Gerberding, 949 P.2d at 1376. 
 129. See id. at 1374. 
 130. League, 295 P.3d at 750. A more expansive discussion of the Washington Supreme 
Court’s Gerberding analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but one point is worth considering: 
How can the Washington Supreme Court find that Gerberding supports ignoring the context and 
meaning of words, such as a provision’s negative phrasing, when the court must interpret words 
within their grammatical context? See id. If Washington’s Supreme Court really believes Gerberding 
stands for that proposition, it should overrule Gerberding as contrary to the judiciary’s interpretive 
role. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 84. 
 131. Gerberding, 949 P.2d at 1373. 
 132. Id. at 1368. 
 133. Id. at 1368–69. 
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 Article II, section 7 provides legislative qualifications: “No per-
son shall be eligible to the legislature who shall not be a citizen of the 
United States and a qualified voter in the district for which he is cho-
sen.”
135
 Article III, section 25 provides executive officer qualifications: 
“No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector 
of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office . . . .”
136
 
 The Gerberding majority resolved the issue textually. The court 
looked at article III, sections 19–23.
137
 Those provisions create the offic-
es of treasurer, state auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public 
instruction, and commissioner of public lands. All of these provisions 
contain similar language to the effect that the position “shall perform 
such duties as shall be prescribed by law”
138
—indicating the framers in-
tended that the legislature maintain control over these offices.
139
 As a 
default rule, the legislature has plenary power unless the constitution’s 
text restricts the legislature either expressly or by fair inference.
140
 The 
express grant of power to the legislature in sections 19–23 acts as an im-
plied restriction on legislative power: The Gerberding majority conclud-
ed that the framers’ express grant of power to the legislature over specif-
ic executive offices indicated that the framers thought the legislature 
lacked this default power.
141
 Therefore, the legislature lacks power over 




 Because the framers did not grant the legislature express power 
over the governor or over qualifications for legislators, the people and 
the legislature lacked power to impose statutory term limits.
143
 It was 
                                                                                                                                        
 134. Id. 
 135. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 7 
 136. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 25 
 137. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 19 (providing that the treasurer “shall perform such duties as 
shall be prescribed by law”); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 20 (providing that the state auditor “shall have 
such powers and perform such duties in connection therewith as may be prescribed by law”); WASH. 
CONST. art. III, § 21 (providing that the attorney general “shall be the legal adviser of the state offic-
ers, and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law”); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 22 
(providing superintendent of public instruction “shall have supervision over all matters pertaining to 
public schools, and shall perform such specific duties as may be prescribed by law); WASH. CONST. 
art. III § 23 (providing that commissioner of public lands “shall perform such duties and receive 
such compensation as the legislature may direct”). 
 138. See sources cited supra note 137. 
 139. Geberding, 949 P.2d at 1374. 
 140. See, e.g., Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1959). 
 141. Gerberding, 949 P.2d at 1374. (“The framers were careful to spell out the extent of legis-
lative power over other constitutional offices, indicating that if the framers intended the Legislature 
to have authority to add to the qualifications of WASH. CONST. art. II, § 7, and art. III, § 25, they 
would have so stated.”). 
 142. Id. at 1377. 
 143. See id. 
882 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:865 
with this textual logic—not the broad proposition that negative language 
cannot create minimum requirements—that the Gerberding majority re-
solved the textual question at issue.
144
 
2. “Tyranny of the Minority”—A Red Herring 
 The court in League invoked the policy concern that if it upheld 
the Supermajority, the Supermajority would “fundamentally alter” Wash-
ington’s system of government.
145
 The court reasoned that the history 
and language of Washington’s constitution demonstrate a principle that 
favors a simple majority vote for legislation.
146
 If the court read article II, 
section 22 as permitting the Supermajority, legislative power would shift. 
Instead of a simple majority possessing power to control legislation, now 
a small minority would possess power to resist legislation, creating a 
“tyranny of the minority.”
147
 On further examination, however, the 
court’s tyranny of the minority concern is a red herring. 
 Under Washington’s constitution, a legislature cannot pass a law 
that prevents a future legislature from exercising its power to amend or 
repeal that law.
148
 Therefore, the court incorrectly concluded that the Su-
permajority would “fundamentally alter” Washington’s government.
149
 
Imagine this hypothetical: The legislature passes the Supermajority re-
quirement by statute. After the legislature is “fundamentally altered,” a 
special interest group, such as the League of Education Voters, comes to 
the legislature. The special interest group makes a worthy policy sugges-
tion: The legislature should pass a law that closes tax loopholes to 
wealthy businesses, and the tax revenue generated by this action can then 
support underfunded education issues. A simple majority of the legisla-
ture—both houses—applaud this proposal. Yet the remaining members 
refuse to consider the bill. A dutiful legislator reminds everyone that a 
simple majority of the legislature cannot pass the bill because of the stat-
                                                             
 144. Id. at 1376. 
 145. League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 751 (Wash. 2013). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 751. The court stated that “the framers were particularly concerned with a tyranny of 
the minority.” As support for the framers’ fear, the majority cites a law review article: Kristen L. 
Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington’s Law of Law-Making, 39 GONZ. L. 
REV. 447, 449–50 (2004) (noting framers feared “special interests that might capture or corrupt 
public institutions” without further elaboration or citation). Ironically, the majority seems unaware 
that League of Education Voters—a special interest group, albeit with the laudable goal of education 
reform—lobbied for the failed passage of SHB 2078, as discussed supra in Part II. 
 148. Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 174 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Wash. 2007) (“No 
legislature can enact a statute that prevents a future legislature from exercising its law-making pow-
er. That which a prior legislature has enacted, the current legislature can amend or repeal. Like all 
previous legislatures, it is limited only by the constitutions.”); see also WASH. CONST. art II, § 22. 
 149. See League, 295 P.3d at 750. 
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utory Supermajority requirement. Suddenly, another legislator has a bril-
liant idea: A simple majority of the legislature—those favoring the tax-
loophole-closing proposal—can repeal the Supermajority requirement 
and pass the bill.
150
 
 This hypothetical shows that a statutory supermajority poses no 
real threat against Washington’s system of government because the legis-
lature can always repeal the supermajority by a simple majority vote.
151
 
3. Slippery Slope, i.e., Democracy 
 The court raised a slippery slope argument
152
 as another reason 
to reject an interpretation that would uphold the Supermajority.
153
 In that 
discussion, the court broke the promise made in the beginning of its 
opinion: “[O]ur opinion does not reflect whether [the supermajority pro-
vision] embod[ies] sound policies.”
154
 Yet, toward the end of the opinion, 
the court chastised the Supermajority and its hypothetical ilk as “antithet-




 The court feared that if it upheld the Supermajority, “a simple 
majority . . . of the legislature could require particular bills to receive 90 
percent approval rather than just a two-thirds approval, thus essentially 
ensuring that those types of bills would never pass.”
156
 Given the repeal 
discussion, supra,157 the court’s fear seems excessive. Even if a simple 
                                                             
 150. If the legislature had solely passed the Supermajority proposal, the solution would really 
be this simple. You might wonder: Why did anyone care about this statutory Supermajority require-
ment if the issue could be resolved so easily? The Supermajority proposal presented a practical issue 
because the people of Washington State passed the Supermajority by initiative. See discussion supra 
Part II. When the people pass an initiative, Washington’s constitution restricts the legislature from 
modifying or repealing that initiative for two years unless the legislature can amass two-thirds—a 
supermajority—of elected members in both houses. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c). However, for the 
purpose of constitutional analysis, the judiciary treats laws passed by the legislature and by initiative 
in the same manner. See discussion supra Part II. Therefore, on a theoretical level, the fact that the 
Supermajority was passed by initiative does not change the legal analysis. On a practical level, how-
ever, the initiative process created a significant hurdle for the legislature to either modify or repeal 
the Supermajority. Because the practical impact of an initiative-passed law is a common aspect of 
the initiative process, it is not especially germane to the Supermajority discussion. See discussion 
supra Part II. For a discussion on the perils created by the initiative process, see Brewster C. Denny, 
Initiatives—Enemy of the Republic, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025 (2001). 
 151. See Wash. State Farm, 174 P.3d at 1145; see also WASH. CONST. art II, § 22. 
 152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1731 (9th ed. 2009) (A slippery-slope argument is also 
known as the “wedge principle,” which means “[t]he argument that relaxation of a constitutionally 
imposed restraint under specific circumstances may justify further relaxation in broader circum-
stances”). 
 153. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 154. Id. at 745. 
 155. Id. at 751. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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majority of the legislature required 100% approval on all legislation, a 
simple majority could always repeal this restriction.
158
 Although the 
court rejected the wisdom of the Supermajority, judicial disfavor of a 
statute cannot justify holding that statute unconstitutional.
159
 
IV. INTERPRETIVE DOUBT: THE KEY TO JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT 
 Historically, when a party challenged a statute’s constitutionality 
in state court, the court invoked the rule that it would not strike down a 
statute unless the challenger proved the statute unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
160
 The majority in League also invoked this rule, as 
have many Washington courts before it.
161
 This rule creates a presump-
tion that the challenged statute is constitutional, and the party bringing 
the challenge bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
162
 
 At one time, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine presented a 
formidable obstacle against courts voiding a statute, causing at least one 
justice to complain that the court may uphold unconstitutional statutes 
under the doctrine’s burdensome presumption.
163
 If the doctrine once 
created a heavy burden for a challenger to prevail, like a large boulder 
that must be pushed uphill, the burden no longer appears so heavy. In-
stead, the boulder has been reduced to the size of a pebble, and some jus-
tices appear willing to help challengers push.
164
 
 This Part suggests a new paradigm for conceptualizing and ap-
plying the beyond-a reasonable-doubt doctrine in the context of state 
constitutional interpretation. Washington courts must reinvigorate the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine to prevent judges and justices from 
holding statutes unconstitutional when the statute does not clearly con-
flict with the constitution’s text. After all, the judiciary should void a 
statute because the constitution requires this outcome; judges should not 
                                                             
 158. See Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 174 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Wash. 2007); see 
also WASH. CONST. art II, § 22. 
 159. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 218. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., League, 295 P.3d at 749; Ferguson-Hendrix Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md., 140 P. 700, 701 (Wash. 1914) (“The presumption always obtains that a legislative act is consti-
tutional, and it will only be held unconstitutional where it so plainly appears to be so as to free the 
mind from reasonable doubt.”). 
 162. League, 295 P.3d at 749. 
 163. See Island Cnty. v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 391 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (“For, 
quite literally, the maxim requires us to hold either a statute is proved unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or we must uphold it, which literally requires us to opine: Either a statute is proved 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, or we will hold it is constitutional even if it really 
isn’t.”). 
 164. See discussion supra Part III. 
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strike down a statute simply because they dislike its wisdom and simply 
because they can.
165
 When a judge strikes down a statute that can be 
harmonized with the constitution, the judge’s invocation of judicial prov-
ince to “say what the law is” transforms this phrase from a constitutional 




A. Historical Justification for the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Doctrine 
 In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley noted that state courts 
tasked with determining the constitutionality of a statute applied the be-
yond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine out of deference to the legislature.
167
 
Washington cases adopted this theoretical justification for Washington 
constitutional analysis.
168
 In 1998, the court in Island County v. State 
explained the doctrine’s rationale: 
The reason for this high standard is based on our respect for the leg-
islative branch of government as a co-equal branch of government, 
which, like the court, is sworn to uphold the constitution. We as-
sume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enact-
ments and afford some deference to that judgment. Additionally, the 
Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly 
enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analy-
sis, that the statute violates the constitution.
169
 
 The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine’s historical rationale—
deference based on the belief that the legislature considered the constitu-
tionality of its enactment—has three primary weaknesses. First, the legis-
lature does not pass all laws in Washington.
170
 The people of Washington 
State also pass legislation through the initiative process.
171
 Yet, even 
when Washington courts confront a constitutional challenge to an initia-
tive-created statute, they still invoke the language that the challenger 
must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
172
 The 
doctrine’s historical rationale, however, applies only to statutes enacted 
                                                             
 165. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 205 (discussing how courts are not free to declare a statute 
void when the statute violates no express words in the constitution, even if the court feels the statute 
violates the constitution’s “spirit”). 
 166. See League, 295 P.3d at 753. 
 167. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 219. 
 168. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in Gen-
eral Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 721 (1999). 
 169. Island Cnty. v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1998). 
 170. The supermajority requirement, for example, originated from an initiative. See discussion 
supra Part II. 
 171. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c) (detailing the people’s initiative power). 
 172. See, e.g., League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 749 (Wash. 2013). 
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by the legislature. Therefore, the doctrine’s historical rationale does not 
always justify its utility in state court constitutional analysis. 
 Second, the historical rationale rests on the assumption that the 
legislature “considered the constitutionality of its enactments,” and there-
fore, as a coequal branch, the legislature’s consideration deserves great 
deference.
173
 This rationale assumes that the legislature, sworn to uphold 
the constitution, would not intentionally pass an unconstitutional law.
174
 
While this assumption might be true, the assumption serves no purpose 
in constitutional analysis because the court must still interpret the chal-
lenged text and void unconstitutional statutes, regardless of the legisla-
ture’s good intentions. 
 Imagine the legislature intends to pass an unconstitutional law.
175
 
Unfortunately, due to sloppy drafting, the legislature’s statute does not 
conflict with any constitutional provision. A constitutional challenge 
against the statute reaches the Washington Supreme Court. The underly-
ing presumption—that the legislature intended to pass a constitutional 
law—has been rebutted, but the statute clearly does not conflict with the 
constitution. In this situation, the court should uphold the statute despite 
the legislature’s unconstitutional intent.
176
 Similarly, the court should 
strike down a statute when it clearly conflicts with the constitution, re-
gardless of the legislature’s good intentions.
177
 Thus, the Washington 
Supreme Court’s deference rationale serves no practical purpose for the 
court’s constitutional analysis or judicial function. 
 Third, a court’s reluctance to void legislative judgment—the leg-
islature’s belief that it passed a constitutional law—distracts from what 
courts actually void by declaring a statute unconstitutional: legislative 
power. Under Washington’s constitution, the legislature has plenary 
power unless the constitution’s text, either expressly or by fair inference, 
limits that power.
178
 Courts should hesitate to void statutes because any 
unnecessary finding of unconstitutionality impermissibly invades the 
legislature’s province to make laws.
179
 If the text does not require an un-
                                                             
 173. Island Cnty., 955 P.2d at 380. 
 174. Id. 
 175. In reality, it might be difficult to show that the legislature intended to pass an unconstitu-
tional law. For the sake of argument, we will assume that the legislature included its unconstitutional 
intent in the statute’s preamble. 
 176. See COOLEY, supra note 11. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See, e.g., State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 110 P.2d 162, 167 (Wash. 1941); Malyon v. Pierce 
Cnty., 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1997). 
 179. See sources cited supra note 178.  
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constitutional outcome, the judicial branch has no authority to invade the 
legislature’s province of power.
180
 
B. The Confusing Articulation of the Doctrine—Not an                        
Evidentiary Standard 
 The court in Island County distinguished the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard in the context of constitutional interpretation 
from the reasonable doubt standard applied in criminal proceedings, cre-
ating an unnecessarily confusing articulation of the doctrine: “[I]n the 
context of a criminal proceeding as the standard necessary to convict an 
accused of a crime, [beyond a reasonable doubt] is an evidentiary stand-
ard and refers to ‘the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude 
of the facts in issue.’”
181
 But in the context of constitutional interpreta-
tion when a statute’s constitutionality is challenged, the standard “refers 
to the fact that one challenging a statute must, by argument and research, 




 The court’s description, comparing the standard in a criminal 
prosecution to the standard in constitutional interpretation, creates confu-
sion rather than clarity. When articulating the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
doctrine, courts often cite Island County for the proposition that the doc-
trine is not an “evidentiary standard.”
183
 But no court has since elaborat-
ed on why this distinction matters for the purpose of constitutional analy-
sis. Although the focus obviously differs for reaching a judgment in a 
criminal prosecution versus a constitutional challenge—a bloody knife in 
a murder prosecution, for example, versus the text of Washington’s con-
stitution—it is unclear beyond stating this obvious distinction why Island 
County’s description matters. Moving forward, courts should ignore this 
unhelpful description when articulating the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
doctrine and, instead, focus on its application. 
                                                             
 180. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 205 (discussing how the judicial branch has no authority to 
void a statute unless the express words in the constitution justify that result). 
 181. Island Cnty. v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1998) (citing State v. Smith, 759 P.2d 
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C. A New Paradigm for the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Doctrine 
1. A New Theoretical Rationale 
 Under Washington’s constitution, the legislature has plenary 
power unless the constitution’s text either expressly or by fair inference 
limits that power.
184
 Courts should therefore hesitate to void statutes 
when they do not clearly conflict with the constitution because, without 
clear conflict, the legislature’s power remains unrestrained.
185
 If a rea-
sonable interpretation of the constitution exists that will harmonize the 
constitution with the statute, the existence of this reasonable interpreta-
tion means that the constitution’s text does not clearly conflict with the 
statute, and the statute is, therefore, constitutional.
186
 The judicial branch 
must uphold the statute in light of this reasonable interpretation.
187
 Oth-
erwise, when the court voids the statute, it is the judiciary and not the 
constitution that forced the unconstitutional outcome, and the judiciary 
lacks authority to void constitutional laws.
188
 
Under the new theoretical rationale, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
doctrine will exist to prevent judges from voiding otherwise constitution-
al laws and from unconstitutionally invading the legislature’s province of 
plenary power. 
2. Principles of the Recreated Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Doctrine 
Four principles should guide courts when they apply the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt doctrine. First, the statute’s wisdom should not influ-
ence the court.
189
 For example, the court in League said it would restrain 
itself from judging the Supermajority’s wisdom and then proclaimed that 
a tyranny of the minority would occur if it upheld the statute as constitu-
tional.
190
 This commentary may be apt for discussing the wisdom of 
Washington’s constitution; it does not belong as a judicial justification 
for finding a statute unconstitutional.
191
 
 Second, sources extrinsic to the constitution’s text, such as con-
vention debates and dictionaries, are permissible aids for interpreting the 
                                                             
 184. See, e.g., State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 110 P.2d 162, 167 (Wash. 1941); Malyon v. Pierce 
Cnty., 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1997) (“Appropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text 
and, for most purposes, should end there as well.”). 
 185. See sources cited supra note 184. 
 186. See sources cited supra note 184. 
 187. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 218. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., League of Educ. Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 746 (Wash. 2013); see also 
COOLEY, supra note 11, at 86. 
 190. League, 295 P.3d at 751. 
 191. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 86. 
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constitution’s text.
192
 But when a reasonable constitutional interpretation 
remains after consulting these sources that harmonizes the challenged 
statute with the constitution’s text, the court must uphold the statute.
193
 
 Third, the goal of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine is not 
to determine if an unconstitutional interpretation of the challenged text is 
more reasonable than a constitutional interpretation. Instead, the goal is 




Fourth, if the constitution’s text does not address an issue, either 
expressly or by fair inference, the challenged statute cannot conflict with 




3. Applying the Doctrine to League of Education Voters v. State 
 The court in League found a reasonable interpretation of article 
II, section 22 that harmonized the constitution with the Supermajority. In 
its plain language discussion, the court said that “essentially [article II, 
section 22] states that a bill cannot become a law upon any condition less 
than receiving more than half the vote.”
196
 
Here, the court interpreted article II, section 22’s plain text as creat-
ing a minimum vote requirement; a bill must receive “more than half the 
vote.”
197
 If this interpretation is accepted as complete, the text of article 
II, section 22 does not address a maximum voting requirement,
198
 and 
therefore, the legislature’s power in this area remains unrestrained.
199
 If 
the court had accepted its own textual analysis, the legislature could stat-
utorily increase the vote requirement above the simple-majority mini-
mum, rendering the Supermajority constitutional. 
The court further strengthened this harmonious interpretation when 
it discussed the framers’ convention debates.
200
 Although the framers 
specifically included a majority vote requirement in article II, section 22, 
“[t]here was no discussion of whether the legislature should be allowed 
to alter this requirement.”
201
 While we can ascertain from the text that the 
                                                             
 192. See, e.g., State v. Brunn, 154 P.2d 826, 836 (Wash. 1945). 
 193. See COOLEY, supra note 11, at 218. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. at 86. 
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framers wanted to establish a minimum vote requirement,
202
 the court 
obliviously makes clear that we can only speculate about what they 
might have thought about a statutory increase.
203
 
Because a reasonable interpretation of the text existed that harmo-
nized the Supermajority with the constitution, the Washington Supreme 
Court had no constitutional authority to strike down the statute.
204
 The 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine requires the court to uphold the stat-
ute in this situation, even if an unconstitutional interpretation, in the 
court’s mind, is more reasonable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision in League misinterpret-
ed the judiciary’s role and Washington’s constitution. In Washington, the 
legislature’s power to pass laws is unrestrained unless the constitution’s 
text expressly or inferentially prohibits the use of legislative power. 
Therefore, the constitution authorizes the judiciary to void statutes as 
unconstitutional only when the statute clearly violates the constitution’s 
text. If a reasonable interpretation harmonizes the constitution with a 
challenged statute, the statute does not conflict with the constitution, and 
the judiciary must uphold it. 
In League, the court found a reasonable interpretation of article II, 
section 22 of Washington’s constitution as creating a minimum vote re-
quirement, a simple majority, for bill passage. Under this interpretation, 
the constitution’s text remains silent about the legislature’s ability to 
statutorily increase the vote requirement, and therefore, the legislature’s 
lawmaking power in this area is unrestrained. Because this constitutional 
interpretation would uphold the Supermajority as constitutional, the court 
lacked authority to ignore it and to void the Supermajority. By voiding 
the Supermajority, the Washington Supreme Court unconstitutionally 
invaded the legislature’s province and voided the legislature’s power. 
Courts must reinvigorate the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt doctrine in 
state constitutional analysis to prevent judges from striking down consti-
tutional laws. While the application of the doctrine might appear judicial-
ly self-imposed, the doctrine is constitutionally required. If a reasonable 
interpretation of the constitution will uphold a statute, the judiciary lacks 
constitutional authority to declare the statute void. 
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